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Abstract
The paper is an attempt to show that the formalism of subjective probability has a logical in-
terpretation of the sort proposed by Frank Ramsey: as a complete set of constraints for consistent
distributions of partial belief. Though Ramsey proposed this view, he did not actually establish it in a
way that showed an authentically logical character for the probability axioms (he started the current
fashion for generating probabilities from suitably constrained preferences over uncertain options).
Other people have also sought to provide the probability calculus with a logical character, though
also unsuccessfully. The present paper gives a completeness and soundness theorem supporting a
logical interpretation: the syntax is the probability axioms, and the semantics is that of fairness (for
bets).
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1. Anticipations
The connection between deductive logic and probability, at any rate epistemic probabil-
ity, has been the subject of exploration and controversy for a long time: over three centuries,
in fact. Both disciplines specify rules of valid non-domain-specific reasoning, and it would
seem therefore a reasonable question why one should be distinguished as logic and the
other not. I will argue that there is no good reason for this difference, and that both are
indeed equally logic. I should add that this is by no means a novel claim: it also goes right
back to the beginnings of the mathematical theory of probability. Leibniz in the Nouveaux
Essais and elsewhere said so explicitly (‘Probability is a new kind of logic’), and the idea
runs like a thread, at times more visible, at times less, through the subsequent history of
epistemic probability. In the nineteenth century it was taken up by de Morgan and also, in
terms of a semantic approach to logic that anticipated the much later ideas of Tarski, by
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Bolzano. It reappeared in the twentieth century in the work of Keynes, Ramsey, Jeffreys,
de Finetti, Carnap, Savage (fleetingly), and E.T. Jaynes. Some quotations will convey the
flavour of their views:
Keynes:
‘What particular propositions we select as the premises of our argument naturally de-
pends on subjective factors peculiar to ourselves; but the relations, in which other
propositions stand to these, and which entitle us to probable beliefs, are objective and
logical’ [15, p. 4].
Carnap:
‘ “Inductive logic” is here understood as the theory of probability in the logical or in-
ductive sense’ [2, p. 35].
Ramsey:
‘We find, therefore, that a precise account of the nature of partial belief reveals that the
laws of probability are laws of consistency, an extension to partial beliefs of formal [de-
ductive] logic, the logic of consistency . . . they merely distinguish those sets of beliefs
which obey them as consistent ones’ [19, p. 182].
De Finetti:
‘[if] it is possible to bet with [an individual] in such a way as to be assured of gaining,
. . . the evaluation of probabilities given by this individual contains an inconsistency,
an intrinsic contradiction’ ([3, p. 103]; ‘consistent’ is a standard interpretation of ‘co-
hérent’, though the editors of the volume in which the translation from the original
French appears adopt the term ‘coherent’ precisely because they reject any assimilation
to the logical notion of consistency, a decision somewhat surprising in the light of the
fact that de Finetti always stressed the logical nature of his enterprise).
Jeffreys:
‘We are trying to construct an extended logic, of which deductive logic will be a part’
[14, p. 17].
Savage:
‘It has therefore been asked whether logic cannot be extended . . . to bear more fully on
uncertainty. An attempt to extend logic in this way will be begun in this chapter’ [20,
p. 6].
Jaynes:
‘Our theme is simply: Probability Theory as Extended Logic’ [12, xi].
C. Howson / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 151–165 153
The manifesto-like quotation from Jaynes is the most recent expression of a view of
the rules of probability first proposed at their very inception, revived at various intervals
afterwards, and is still around. Yet (pace Jaynes) it has never yielded any valuable fruit to
speak of, nor has epistemic probability it ever become regarded by the logic community
itself as an authentic branch of logic. Why not? An idea of the likely explanation can be
garnered from further remarks made by these authors:
‘Any definite set of degrees of belief which broke them (the laws of probability) would
be inconsistent in the sense that it violated the laws of preference between options, such as
that preferability is a transitive asymmetrical relation (etc)’ (Ramsey). Savage says much
the same, and de Finetti and Carnap invoke the Dutch Book theorem as a prudential con-
dition constraining rational betting behaviour. Jeffreys makes no attempt to justify the
probability axioms as anything other than principles of rational belief (and the way num-
bers are assigned he calls ‘conventions’), and Keynes systematically conflates ‘logical’ and
‘rational’. Jaynes’s notion of logic even appeals to rules of common sense: his principle of
‘Qualitative Correspondence with Common Sense’ is used at various crucial points in the
argument for the probability axioms. E.g., it dictates that the plausibility of not-A is a
monotone continuous decreasing function of the plausibility of A, when scaled in the unit
interval [12, p. 206].
It seems a fair enough comment that there is no settled view evident in these motley re-
marks even of what logic itself is about. Nor does the prospect look good for tying together
whatever common threads there may be in them into an account which would justify the
claim that, as far as logic as we understand it today is concerned, it and probability share
some identity of structure or even purpose. According to the post-Fregean paradigm devel-
oped by Hilbert, Löwenheim, Skolem, Tarski and Gödel, logic is a sort of general theory of
truth across structures of a given type (this is broad enough to include classical logic based
on standard Tarskian semantics as well as extensions involving possible-world semantics).
Common sense, plausibility, the desirability of possessing transitive preferences, etc. are
not, whatever else they might be, logical constraints according to that view. There are ad-
mittedly ways of embedding the formal theory of probability into what looks like a logical
framework, with probabilities assigned to the sentences of familiar formalised languages,
together with a suggestive semantics of so-called probability-models. However, even this
enterprise does not in my view suffice to make the probability-part of such a combination
logical (I shall say precisely why I think so a little later).
Maybe, then, the conclusion should be that epistemic, or as I shall call it from now on,
Bayesian probability, really is not a species of logic after all, and that the thinkers listed
above were all systematically misled and misleading. Reinforcing this negative conclusion
is the fact that according to most thinkers in the Bayesian camp the rules of probability are
really part of a more general theory of rational belief and decision. Savage’s nod in the
direction of logic was indeed just that, a nod: the theory he is about to develop is, he tells
us, a theory of ‘the behaviour of a “rational” person with respect to decisions’ [20, p. 7]. In
locating Bayesian probability within the theoretical milieu of utility and rational decision,
and with his emphasis on the behavioural elicitation of ‘personal probabilities’ (Savage’s
own term) he was, of course, also following Ramsey, who was the first to lay develop an
axiomatic theory of preference as a necessary preliminary to a theory of probability.
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But there is a problem with casting Bayesian probability as a subtheory of a theory of
rationality, one Savage himself implicitly called attention to by saying that he was only
developing a model of rational behavior (ibid.), implying a corresponding degree of ideali-
sation. Even in these terms, however, his account seems to have little to do with rationality
as ordinarily understood, a feature shown up in the fact that in incorporating the standard
rules of probability (Kolmogorov’s axioms minus the axiom of continuity) it embodies
constraints which in any but very simple applications are beyond the capacity of any ra-
tional agent to obey. For example, Savage’s “rational” agent must possess a representation
of all the elements of an algebra of events together with the inclusion relation (i.e., logical
consequence) between them. It is hardly surprising that one of the most serious charges
against the theory, as a theory of the behaviour of a rational agent, is that it assumes an
in-principle impossible ‘logical omniscience’ [4, p. 124]. A uniformly real-valued proba-
bility measure, which not only thereby totally orders all the events in its domain but also
assigns all of them exact number-values, is equally problematic within such a model. The
objection is not substantially deflected by appeal to its idealising character: a model of
rational behaviour that makes no allowance for the fact that people are highly bounded
reasoners, using irreducibly vague estimates of probability, is an inadequate model; hence
the various attempts over the last forty or so years to develop what Hacking called ‘slightly
more realistic personal probability’ [8].
I believe that this response is misguided, and based on nothing more than a misidentifi-
cation of the model as one of rational belief. The misidentification is all the more surprising
in that the features which prevent the standard Bayesian model from being a plausible
theory of rationality—sharp values, closure under the Boolean operations—are strikingly
features it has in common with the models of ordinary deductive logic. Just those suppos-
edly objectionable features of the Bayesian model should have cued any informed observer
to at least suspect a degree of functional similarity between the two types of system, in
terms of what the models are supposed to do. We understand reasonably well the role of the
usual formal systems of classical deductive logic, as models of valid deductive inference
(not, at any rate since Frege, of the thought-processes of even ideal deductive inferrers).
More than that, they are simplifying, and in some ways crudely simplifying, models, sub-
stituting sharply bivalent, total truth-valuations for the universally more or less vague and
partial ones in natural and even scientific language.1 This suggests that the Bayesian for-
malism, with its real-valued probabilities defined on a full Boolean algebra, might also
function as a generator of crudely simplifying models of another type of valid inference,
valid uncertain inference. And indeed both models, deductive and probabilistic, can be
suitably refined, for example, by introducing vague, i.e., interval-valued, probabilities on
the one hand and vague predicates on the other.
It must be admitted, however, that so far the tie-up with deductive models remains still
at the level of suggestion. One would clearly have to do more to justify the claim that
Bayesian probability is a species of logic in anything like the sense in which first order
logic is. That is what I shall try to do in what follows.
1 Lakatos famously used the vagueness in the concept of a polyhedron as the starting point from which he
began a celebrated investigation into the foundations of mathematics [17]. Opinion is still far from unanimous on
the meanings of ‘set’, ‘function’, ‘continuous’, and ‘number’ and other basic mathematical notions.
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2. How can probability be logic?The task has been attempted by other advocates of the probability= logic view whose
acquaintance with their own contemporary logic was far from superficial. One rather nat-
ural idea, which goes back to Bolzano, and is associated with early Carnap [1],2 is to see
probability as a sort of generalised semantics. As Bolzano discovered, a very intimate con-
nection with the so-called ‘classical’ definition of probability emerges very naturally. Let
A and B be sentences in some formalised language. B deductively entails A just in case
all B’s models are models of A, i.e., just in case 100% of B’s models are models of A.
This is of course nothing less than the famous favourable-to-possible ratio of the so-called
‘classical definition’ of probability. As Bolzano realised, it offers a promising way of gen-
eralising the relation of consequence to partial consequence, at any rate for finite domains.
For suppose B is satisfied in exactly k structures. Then a natural way of measuring partial
consequence is by computing the percentage of those k structures in which A is satisfied,
and setting P(A|B) equal to this number. Clearly, if A and C are mutually exclusive, then
P(A ∨ C|B) = P(A|B)+ P(C|B), and so P is formally a conditional probability func-
tion. The problem with the restriction to finite domains can be partially solved by working
P(A|B) out, for arbitrary A and B , where the domains are restricted to size n, and letting
n tend to infinity and taking limits where they exist.
This was, of course, Carnap’s strategy in his [1], working with simple monadic predicate
languages without identity. He disliked the result because for the language with n individ-
ual names a1, . . . , an, assumed to name the n distinct individuals in the domain, and single
predicate symbolD, the measure P(.|t), where t is a tautology, is a product measure on the
atoms ±D(a1)& · · ·&±D(an) (+D is D and −D is not-D). Hence for all i,1 < i  n, P
assigns a posterior probability P(D(ai )|D(a1)& · · ·&D(ai−1)) = P(D(ai )|t) = 12 , since
the result is independent of i it clearly holds in the n-limit (it shares this feature with
maximum entropy inference relative to the null constraint set; see Paris, this volume, pp.).
Carnap’s conclusion was that this particular probability function cannot model simple in-
ductive inference.
There is however a more fundamental problem with this approach to a theory of par-
tial entailment: language variance. Suppose L1 and L2 are first order languages with
identity, each having one one-place predicate symbol Q. Suppose also that L1 has no
individual names and L2 has 2. Let A be the sentence ∃xQ(x) and B the sentence
∃x∃y(x 	= y&∀z(z = x ∨ z = y)) for some choice of variables x, y and z; i.e., A states
that at least one individual has Q and B states that there are exactly two individuals. Note
that A and B are common to both languages. However, if as before we take P(A|B) to
measure the proportion of B’s models which are models of A, then identifying isomor-
phic models we find that with respect to L1, P(A|B) = 2/3, while with respect to L2,
P(A|B)= 3/4 (I am making the simplifying assumption in the second case that individu-
als with distinct names are distinct; relaxing the assumption still yields different values for
the two probabilities).
2 And, of course, Keynes: ‘Inasmuch as it is always assumed that we can sometimes judge directly that a
conclusion follows from a premiss, it is no great extension of this assumption to suppose that we can sometimes
recognise that a conclusion partially follows from, or stands in a relation of probability to, a premiss’ [15, p. 56].
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It might be objected that one should always take the value given by the language capa-
ble of the finest-grained distinctions, in this case allegedly L2. There are two things wrong
with this answer. Firstly, it begs the question: why ‘should’ one? We are supposed to be
doing logic here, and logic by itself cannot justify any such preference. Secondly, it pre-
supposes that the language with individual names necessarily makes finer distinctions than
the one without, and this—surprisingly perhaps—is not true. Paired bosons, for example,
are indistinguishable according to quantum mechanics (and their quantum statistics match
those for L1 [23, pp. 70–74]), as are, less exotically, pounds in bank accounts: it makes
no sense to say that there are four distinct ways in which two pounds can be distributed
between two accounts. In these sorts of cases, therefore, there simply is no finer-grained
reality than that described by L1.
My own view is that language-relativity of this degree is a fatal defect in a theory whose
object is to identify a logical relation between two sentences A and B . Such a relation
should arguably be absolute, in the sense of not varying as one varies the ambient language,
just as the relation of ordinary logical consequence is absolute. But as we see, this is not the
case for partial consequence, at any rate as computed in what appears the most natural way.
It seems reasonable to conclude that there is no interesting relation of partial consequence
to be discovered, and I shall take the liberty of generalising this negative conclusion to any
other allegedly ‘reasonable’ theory of partial entailment, because these days it anyway goes
largely uncontested. So what other approach might one take to providing a logical home for
Bayesian probability? I believe that Ramsey had the right view, namely that the probability
calculus generalises not the consequence relation but the property of consistency; though
he (I believe unfortunately) went about trying to show this for a notion of consistency quite
foreign to the deductive one.
In the next section I shall try to connect Ramsey’s insight more closely to contemporary
deductive logic, but before I do so some remarks on the sentence/proposition question will
be helpful. It is usual in formal logic to assign truth-values to things called ‘sentences’,
meaning not sentences as, say, in ordinary English, but a well-defined class of syntactic
objects constructed out of a primitive symbolic vocabulary. People who have been inter-
ested in seeing a logical side to epistemic probability have tended to find it in the fact that
it is possible to assign probabilities directly to sentences in this, the logician’s sense. In-
teresting results have come out of this research. For example, Gaifman proved a ‘logical’
analogue of the Extension Theorem for measures:3 he showed that any probability function
defined on the quantifier-free sentences of a first order language L with denumerably many
constants has a unique extension to the full set of sentences of L satisfying the condition
that the probability of an existentially quantified sentence is the supremum (in the cor-
responding Lindenbaum algebra4) of the probabilities of its instantiations with constants
(Gaifman [5]; this condition is now known as the Gaifman condition). Similar results were
proved for infinitary languages by Scott and Krauss [21], and ‘logical’ versions of Bayesian
convergence-of-opinion theorems have been obtained by Gaifman and Snir [7].
3 This says that any countably additive probability measure on a field of sets has a unique extension to the
Borel closure of that field [16, p. 17].
4 Paris [18, p. 34].
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My view is that assigning probabilities to formal sentences is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for a logical interpretation of probability. The standard formalism of
mathematical probability, in which probabilities are assigned to a class of subsets of some
possibility-space Ω , closed under complementation and intersection and containing the
empty set and Ω , implicitly accommodates a propositional interpretation in that the subsets
can be regarded as extensions of corresponding assertions (starting the other way round,
from a standard logical languageL, the Lindenbaum algebra of L is isomorphic to the class
of sets of models of the sentences of L, with complement and intersection corresponding
to ‘not’ and ‘and’). There is moreover a good case for preferring this framework over one
in which probabilities are assigned directly to the statements of some suitably formalised
language: despite extension theorems like Gaifman’s, the general restriction to finitary op-
erations, if the languages are first order, is very restrictive since it is very useful and natural
to assign probabilities directly to arbitrary (but always countable) infinite disjunctions and
conjunctions, as most of the classic limit theorems of mathematical probability, like the
weak and strong laws of large numbers, do. And while it is true that languages with finite
quantifier strings but denumerable conjunctions and disjunctions are well-understood, and
‘close’ to first order languages in a sense that can be made precise, it seems pointless not
to free oneself entirely of what seems to be an unnecessary and artificial restriction.
Not only is the assignment of probability values to sentences, or more generally formu-
las, of some suitably formalised language not necessary to create a logical interpretation of
probability, it is not sufficient either. To make epistemic probability authentically logical
arguably requires finding some way of interpreting the rules of assignment, i.e., the proba-
bility axioms, as recognisably logical rules. To show that they are rules of consistency for
a notion of consistency demonstrably of the same species as that of deductive consistency
should, one would think, be enough to do satisfy this demand. This is what I shall now try
to do.
3. Consistency
At first sight any such enterprise appears to face a serious difficulty. How can a notion
of the consistency of an assignment of probabilities to propositions be assimilated to that
of deductive consistency, which signifies is a property of sets of sentences? The proposi-
tion/sentence difference is not the problem here, since as we know propositions defined
in the usual set-theoretical way can always be regarded as the extensions of sentences in
some sufficiently expressive language. The problem, or what seems to be a problem, is that
in one case consistency is predicated of assignments of number-values, and in the other of
sets of sentences/propositions. Perhaps surprisingly, this gulf too is less formidable than it
looks, and it is bridged by recognising that the apparently distinct notions are merely sub-
species of a single more general concept, the familiar mathematical concept of consistency
defined as the solvability of sets of equations. To see why this is so, firstly note that a set of
assignments of number-values to a Boolean function is in effect a set of equations. Thus,
considering a consistent set K of assignments to a belief function Bel( ) and a conditional
belief function Bel( | ), Paris writes
158 C. Howson / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 151–165
Consistent means that, with whatever additional conditions currently apply to Bel( ),
Bel( | ), there is a solution satisfying these and the equations in K [18, p. 6].5
The next step consists in observing that deductive consistency is also really nothing but
solvability in this sense. This is easiest to see in the context of a popular deductive system
for first order, and in particular propositional logic, the semantic tableau or tree system.
This type of system is specifically designed to be an efficient test for the deductive consis-
tency of sets of sentences. Here is a simple example: we want to test the set {A,A→ B,




and beneath the last, in this case −B , appending the tableau rule for the unnegated condi-
tional A→B:
−A B
We thus have two branches from the root, on both of which are a sentence and its nega-
tion. This signifies that the set is inconsistent, and the test is complete (the classic text is
Smullyan [22]; more elementary texts are Jeffrey [13] and Howson [9]). This tableau, or
tree, could however have been written in the ‘signed’ form
v(A) = 1 (i)
v(A→ B) = 1 (ii)
v(B)
v(A)= 0 v(B)= 1
= 0 (iii)
where 1 signifies truth and 0 falsity, and v is a truth-valuation function.7
What we see here is most revealing: the signed tree shows that the initial assignment
is now represented by a set of equations which is overdetermined. The equations are un-
solvable over the set of propositional variables: there is no assignment of values to A and
B which satisfies them. If the initial equations were satisfiable, then the (propositional)
tableau rules would generate a single-valued extension of that valuation to all the propo-
sitions in the language [9, pp. 57–60]. It should be clear that all signed tableaux can be
converted into unsigned ones (by first removing all the truth-values and then negating any
sentence to which 0 had been assigned), and conversely. In other words, we see that the
5 Paris takes K more generally to be a set of linear constraints on belief functions.
6 Writing not-B as −B.
7 Smullyan [22], to whom the definition of signed tableaux is due, signs them with T and F ; we equate the
sentences to 1 and 0 to emphasise the equational character of the tableau.
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ordinary concept of deductive consistency, of the truth of a set of sentences in some inter-
pretative structure, is equivalent to the solvability of an assignment of truth-values.8 It is
straightforward to paraphrase Paris’s definition of a consistent set K of assignments ap-
propriately for this deductive example: K (here the set {(i),(ii),(iii)}) is consistent if, with
whatever additional conditions apply to v(), there is a solution satisfying these conditions
and the equations in K . Note that there is nothing specifically to do with truth in this def-
inition. It is in terms of solubility subject to constraints, and the logic we will get from it
arises from the nature of the constraints alone: the logic of consistent assignments of truth-
values subject to the usual classical truth-definition constraints is deductive logic; the logic
of consistent assignments of uncertainty-values, subject to the appropriate constraints on
these, will be probabilistic logic.
This brings us to the next question, of what those constraints should be. An ‘obvious’
answer is that they should comprise (at least) the probability axioms: just as the deductive
constraints, for classical logic at any rate, arise from analysing the concept of truth, so the
corresponding constraints here arise from an analysis of the notion of probability, and we
all know that the basic general principles of probability are summarised in Kolmogorov’s
axioms (with or without countable additivity).9 But that answer begs the question for, as
Paris points out [18, p. 17], we need to have a justification for assuming that Kolmogorov’s
axioms are the appropriate constraints for quantities that are supposed to measure personal
degrees of belief. It is with these that we should start the analysis, as Paris does, and see if
it leads us to the axioms.
4. Fair betting quotients
How should one measure degrees of belief? The Bayesian literature contains a number
of suggestions. It would take too long to review all of them here. What I shall do is take one,
and show how the probability axioms emerge as the appropriate constraints. The measure I
will consider is the individual’s fair odds, or to be more precise, their fair betting quotient.
I shall give a very brief description of how I think this can be evaluated, referring the reader
to a more detailed account in Howson and Urbach [11]. Suppose X and Y are two people
betting, X on a proposition A, Y against, with the winner taking all of a stake S supplied
by a third party. Suppose also that the bet is cancelled before the truth-value of A is known,
and that S is to be equitably divided between X and Y . You are to decide the proportions.
It is reasonable to suppose that the notion of an equitable division should reflect only
your estimate of how likely A is to be true. Suppose you assign pS to X and (1−p)S to Y .
Accordingly we can take p, which must of course lie in the closed unit interval, to be your
numerical estimate of how likely A is to be true, and the ratio p : 1−p to be your fair odds
8 One of the primary applications of the tableau system is, of course, to test the validity of inferences. In the
signed system this means assigning the premises the value 1 and the putative conclusion the value 0 and then
determining whether this assignment is consistent in the sense above. By the completeness theorem for tableaux
the assignment is inconsistent if and only if the resulting tableau, or tree, closes.
9 Kolmogorov does not actually list countably additivity explicitly among his axioms, but an axiom of conti-
nuity equivalent to it.
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on A (since this is only a thought-experiment we can suppose that A can be any factual
proposition whatever, of any level of universality, with if necessary an oracle determining
its truth-value; cf. Gaifman [6, p. 134, n. 4]. If the odds on the truth of a proposition A
are w = w : 1 then w/(1 +w) is called the betting quotient on A. Solving for p, we see
that if w = p : (1 − p) then p is the betting quotient associated with w. If w is your fair
odds, then p is your fair betting quotient on A, fair in the sense that it determines the fair
division of the stake S. It also seems reasonable to identify the end-points 0 and 1 as the
values of p for necessary falsehood and truth, respectively, since if A is the logically true
proposition then X would necessarily have won, and if A is the logically false proposition
Y would necessarily have won. It makes no difference to this analysis whether you are
actually capable of recognising whether any particular statement represents a logical truth
or a logical falsehood (a famous theorem due to the American mathematician and logician
Alonzo Church, proved in 1936, tells us that there is no computable algorithm for doing
this), since you would say, if you were reasonable, that a logical truth would necessarily
win a bet on it and a logical falsehood would necessarily lose one, independently of anyone
being able to identify them as such.
We can now readdress the question of what the constraints should be, other than those
above, relative to which assignments of uncertainty-values, now understood as an agent’s
fair betting quotients, are judged to be consistent or not. The analogy with the constraints
determining classical truth-value assignments suggests that, just as the latter are universal
over all languages with standard formalisation, so too the constraints governing assign-
ments of fair betting quotients should be equally universal, i.e., not tied to specific features
of any particular possible world. And just as the former represent general properties of
truth, so the latter should represent general properties of fairness. Our semantics will be
the semantics of fairness, so to speak, rather than truth. To go further it will be helpful ini-
tially to focus on fair bets and combinations of these. A sum of n fair bets is the pointwise
sum of the component bets, i.e., its payoff is the sum of all the payoffs of the component
bets at each line of the joint truth table: it corresponds to making those n bets simulta-
neously. It seems intuitively correct that fairness should behave with respect to a sum of
fair bets analogously to the way that truth behaves with respect to a conjunction: in other
words, the sum should be fair if and only if all the bets are fair. Put shortly, simultaneous
fair bets should never sum to unfair ones.
But we have to bear two considerations in mind at this point. Firstly, a fair bet, to the
agent, is one whose betting quotient is fair to that person,10 and the sum of fair bets may
not itself amount to a bet on any single proposition. But it also may (a fact well-known to
bookmakers who can sometimes exploit it to the disadvantage of their clients), and where
it does it induces a corresponding functional relationship between the betting quotients
involved. Here is a simple example: if A and B are mutually inconsistent propositions then
10 The St. Petersburg Paradox might be a possible concern here, where according to these criteria the fair odds
on the first head landing at the nth toss of a fair coin are 1 : 2n−1. Thus if the payoff is 2n at each you would need
to stake an infinite amount for the sum of all the bets, with an overwhelming probability of receiving a relatively
small gain. This does not impugn the criteria of fairness above, however, precisely because the sum of these bets
is ill-defined. That the bet for any single value of n is fair is reasonable: by the weak law of large numbers the
average gain in k repetitions will converge to 0 with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
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the sum of two simultaneous bets on A and B with the same stake S and betting quotients
p and q respectively determines a bet on the disjunction A ∨ B with stake S and betting
quotient p + q : the combined bet has the payoff S(1 − [p + q]) if either A or B is true,
and −(p + q)S if both are false. Secondly, we want this analysis to lead to constraints
on betting quotients themselves rather than bets. In the light of these observations we can
frame the condition above in the following way. Suppose that the sum of a set of bets at
the individual’s fair betting quotients determines a bet with unique betting quotient p on
some proposition A. Then that is a fair bet on A and p is the individual’s fair betting
quotient on A. Let (F ) denote this condition together with the other general properties of
fair betting quotients we have postulated (that they lie in the closed unit interval whose end
points 0 and 1 represent, not necessarily uniquely, the quotients for logical falsehood and
logical truth respectively). The point about p having to be unique in the statement above
is to allow for the possibility that more than one choice of stakes might yield a bet on A. It
will turn out that if (F ) is satisfied then any sum of fair bets which determines another bet
will always uniquely determine p.
5. Probability-syntax and semantics
It is a short step from (F ) to the probability axioms. To make it expeditiously some
notation will be useful. We saw earlier that your fair betting quotient determines a bet
on/against A with betting quotient p and stake S, which pays S(1 − p) if A is true and
−pS if A is false (the sign of S determines whether the bet is on or against). These pay-
off conditions can be represented in a more compact form as a single random quantity
S(IA − p), where IA, the so-called indicator function of A, is the function defined on the
underlying possibility-space taking the value 1 on those states in which A is true and 0 on
the others. There is a corresponding representation of conditional bets. A bet on A condi-
tional on the truth of another proposition B , with betting quotient p, is a bet on A that has
the payoff conditions above if B is true (or the decision is made to regard B as true), but
which is called off if B is false. Clearly, such a bet is representable as the random quantity
IBS(IA − p).
We can now make use of the following arithmetical facts:
(a) −S(IA − p)= S(I−A − (1− p)).
(b) Suppose {Ai} is a denumerable family of propositions where Ai&Aj =⊥ for i 	= j ,
that pi are corresponding betting quotients, and thatΣpi exists (this last condition will
be seen later to be satisfied). Then ΣS(IAi − pi)= S(IVAi −Σpi).
(c) If p,q > 0 then there are nonzero numbers S,T ,W such that S(IA&B − p) +
(−T )(IB − q) = IBW(IA − p/q) (T/S must be equal to p/q). The right-hand side
is clearly a conditional bet on A given B with stake W and betting quotient p/q .
The apparent restriction to p > 0 can be eliminated by noting that if p = 0 and p is
the fair betting quotient on A&B then the bet S(IA&B − 0) = S(IA&B) = SIAIB =
IBS(IA − 0); i.e., the bet on A&B determines a bet on A given B with betting quo-
tient 0.
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(F ) implies that if the betting quotients on the left-hand side are fair then so are those
on the right. The way the betting quotients on the left combine to give those on the right
is, of course, just the way the probability calculus tells us that probabilities combine over
compound propositions. An interesting consequence of the equations above is that (F ) can
be seen as a general kind of additivity principle. As we shall see it underwrites the additivity
principle for probabilities, but (c) tells us that it also underwrites the quotient ‘definition’
of conditional probabilities. This kinship, not otherwise apparent, would seem to be of
interest independently of any view one might take of the nature of epistemic probability.
In what follows let  be some σ -algebra of propositions, and let K be an assignment of
personal fair betting quotients to a subset 0 of . We shall say that K is consistent if it is
solvable over , i.e., if it can be extended to a single-valued function on  subject to the
constraint (F ). We can now state the main result:
Theorem 5.1. An assignment K of betting quotients (including conditional betting quo-
tients) is consistent if and only if K is the restriction of some countably additive probability
function to 0; i.e., if and only if K satisfies the rules of the probability calculus.
Proof. Necessity is clear from (a)–(c) above: they tell us that any function on  satisfying
(F ) will have to satisfy also the probability axioms, including that of countable additivity.
For sufficiency, suppose that K is the restriction of some probability function P on . We
need to show that this function satisfies (F ), i.e. if p1, . . . , pk are the betting quotients
on propositions A1, . . . ,Ak given by P , and the sum of bets X1, . . . ,Xk involving those
quotients is itself a bet on some proposition A with betting quotient p, then p = P(A).
Suppose the antecedent is true. Since the expectations of the Xi with respect to P are all
0, it follows that the expected value of Z =ΣXi is 0 also, by the linearity of expectations.
Hence if Z = S(IA − p) for some proposition A then the expected value of the right-hand
side must be zero, in which case p = P(A) (it is a simple exercise to show that the result
continues to hold if one or more of the bets is a conditional bet). ✷
The soundness and completeness theorem for the tableau system for classical propo-
sitional logic can be seen as establishing an extensional equivalence between a semantic
notion of consistency, as a solvable truth-value assignment, and a syntactic one, the open-
ness of a finished tree descending from the initial assignment. What we have shown above
is that a set of betting quotients is consistent, in an analogous sense of being solvable sub-
ject to a set of semantic constraints, just in case they are assigned in accordance with the
rules of the probability calculus. Kolmogorov’s celebrated monograph [16] demonstrated
that the latter can be given as a deductive system (together with a suitable supporting math-
ematical theory, for example, an axiomatisation of set theory like ZFC, Zermelo–Fraenkel
set theory plus Choice). The theorem above can therefore also be seen as establishing an
extensional equivalence between a reasonably semantic notion of consistency and a cor-
responding syntactic one, and hence as providing in effect a soundness and completeness
theorem for probabilistic reasoning.
We can even do what logicians call model theory for this probabilistic logic, by explic-
itly defining a model of a set of assignments. Analogously with propositional logic, we
define a model of a consistent assignment K to be any single-valued extension of K to .
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We can continue the model theory by following the definition of logical (semantic) conse-
quence in deductive logic, and defining a corresponding notion of probabilistic (semantic)
consequence: an assignment α of a probability value to a proposition is a probabilistic con-
sequence of an assignment K just in case every model (in the sense above) of K is a model
of α. From the theorem above we quickly obtain a corollary identifying the probability
axioms as a species of logical axioms:
Corollary 5.2. α is a probabilistic consequence of K if and only if α is a deductive con-
sequence of the probability calculus together with K . (Note that these results can straight-
forwardly be generalised to the case where K consists not just of numerical assignments,
but more general equations, inequations and inequalities involving such assignments.)
The next corollary establishes the equivalence of the constraint of coherence, in de
Finetti’s sense of an assignment of betting quotients which does not combine with any set
of stakes to generate bets which would guarantee the bettor a positive loss or gain, to (F )
Corollary 5.3. Suppose K is an assignment to all the members of . Then K is coherent
if and only if K satisfies (F ).
Corollary 5.3 follows immediately from the theorem above and the well-known fact
that a belief function, whose values are betting quotients, is coherent if and only it satisfies
the probability axioms (Paris gives the proof for the axioms without countable additivity
[18, pp. 19–22], and Williamson [24] shows that if one imposes the condition that only
finite sums of money change hands, the proof extends to include the axiom of countable
additivity).
6. Some illuminations
The logical perspective presented above provides, I believe, enlightening answers to
some of the questions regularly raised in the literature on epistemic probability. The charge
of having to suppose the Bayesian agent ‘logically omniscient’ is one. ‘Logical omni-
science’ is clearly not at all a problematic feature if the Bayesian theory is a formal model
of a species of valid inference in the same way that deductive logic is. That all the valid
schemas generated by these models cannot even in principle be represented in any human
agent is not a criticism of them: it is simply not what they are intended to do.
Of greater interest is the abiding countable versus finite additivity question. De Finetti
is well-known for denying that personal probabilities should invariably be countably addi-
tive. His arguments have been the subject of a good deal of discussion, though it is probably
fair to say that most who give an opinion on the matter disagree with him. My own com-
ment will be brief. Far from being a mere mathematical convenience, as de Finetti claimed
and other authors go some way towards accepting (cf. [16, p. 15]), countable additivity
emerges, in the treatment above, as much a basic principle of personal probability as any
of the other axioms of probability. Not only there either: even within the sort of active bet-
ting approach described in de Finetti [3], a good case exists for countable additivity [24].
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I shall finish with a brief reference to the notorious problem of induction. Hume pro-
duced a celebrated circularity argument, that any justification for believing ‘that the future
will resemble the past’ in any specified manner must explicitly or implictly assume what
it sets out to prove. I believe (and argue the claim at length in Howson [10]) that Hume’s
argument shows informally and in general terms that a valid inductive inference must pos-
sess, in addition to whatever observational or experimental data is specified, at least one
independent assumption (an inductive assumption) that in effect weights some of the pos-
sibilities consistent with the evidence more than others. The Bayesian theory viewed in a
logical perspective endorses this view in a quite satisfactory way, and in so doing reveals a
further illuminating parallel with deductive logic. A nontrivial conclusion (i.e., not a the-
orem of logic) of a deductively valid inference depends on at least one nontrivial premise.
Similarly, a nontrivial conclusion (i.e., not a theorem of probability) of a valid probabilistic
argument depends on one or more nontrivial probabilistic premises. And just as the logical
axioms in Hilbert-style axiomatisations of classical logic are regarded as empty of factual
content because they are universally valid, so is the same true of the probability axioms in
the view we have been advocating. As Corollary 5.2 above shows, they too can be regarded
as logical axioms, empty of factual content because universally valid.
Thus we have a probabilistic analogue of the celebrated conservation result of deduc-
tive logic, that valid deductive inference does not beget new factual content, but merely
transforms or diminishes the content already existing in the premises. So too here. Ramsey
himself saw this clearly:
This is simply bringing probability into line with ordinary formal logic, which does
not criticize premises but merely declares that certain conclusions are the only ones
consistent with them. [19, p. 91]
We can say a little more than that. The ‘synthetic’ premises in a probabilistic inference
are generally prior, or unconditional, probabilities, and because their exogenous nature is
explicitly acknowledged within the so-called subjective Bayesian theory they are often seen
as its Achilles heel. Hume’s argument enables us to view them in a less unfavourable light,
for it implies that some degree of indeterminacy is a natural and indeed inevitable feature
in any adequate theory of valid inductive inference. Far, therefore, from being the disabling
feature of the subjective Bayesian theory they are usually made out to be, prior distribu-
tions, together with the partition of logical space with respect to which they are defined
(that is, the hypothesis-space chosen), merely show where that indeterminacy is located.
7. Conclusion
In the nineteenth century it was not uncommon to regard logic and probability as both
parts of a more encompassing logic, considered as a general theory of laws of rational
thinking. Following Frege’s devastating onslaught this psychologistic theory of logic was
generally abandoned and replaced by the new paradigm of logic as the theory of syntaxes
based on various types of model-structures. In consequence, it seemed that people would
just have to get used to seeing probability as a conceptually distinct enterprise, expelled
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from what seemed to have been its rightful domain since the time of the Port Royal Logic.
But comfort was at hand: the development of utility theory and the apparent naturalness of
the representation of probabilities within that theoretical matrix rendered the sundering of
logic and probability not only painless, but in all likelihood a mutually beneficial develop-
ment in which both disciplines could now concentrate profitably on their proper areas of
activity.
I nevertheless believe that the utility-framework is ultimately unhelpful (a more detailed
case is made in Howson and Urbach [11, Chapter 3]). As I pointed out at the beginning of
this discussion, the Bayesian theory has very characteristic features that actively militate
against its being regarded as a theory of rationality, but which are entirely familiar and
natural properties of a model of valid inference as logical in its way as the usual formal
models of deductive inference are in theirs. After the divorce, a remarriage? There are
grounds for hope.
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